1. In the intro, the following sentence seems awkward to read,
Quote:
King Philip’s War did not evict the Colonials rather it destroyed the military power of the most prominent New England Indian Nations.
It reads to me like there should be some kind of pause. "King Philip’s War did not evict the Colonials. Rather it destroyed the military power of the most prominent New England Indian Nations."
2. This other comment has to do with some of my research on the war. From what I read, I recall that the Indian Nations manpower was severely hamstrung by having to leave the front to tend their fields. I remember reading that the colonials were able to consistently field military forces throughout the conflict because of their superior logistic capabilities (the ability to feed both populace and military in the winter, and thus keep a large military in the field). Time and again it seemed that any momentum gained by the Indian forces was lost when their troops drifted back to their villages to help in harvest or food gathering/storage.
The "Provisions" rule seems to be a weak assertion of this, but it doesn't seem to catch the infuriating loss of initiative that the Indians had. Or am I missing something here?
I'm not sure that the Indians were hamstrung so much because of leaving the battlefield for the maizefield as much as being hamstrung for their lack of coordination and suspicion of each other ( Traits that the colonials apparently mirrored). It seems to be historic that the Indian's inability to tend to their fields did lead to a food shortage in the winter of 1675 and a slackening of their will to pursue the war. It's also true that to abate hunger they gathered at fish spawning areas in the Spring which made them easier targets for the colonials. But it is also true that the Indian's destruction of the English fields in the Connecticut valley pinched the Colonial effort to victual their own people and their troops.
From what I've read I would argue that The English were not able to consistently field as large a contingent all Winter long. On a couple of poorly engineered campaigns, yes, but not all winter long. I've read nothing to indicate that braves leaving the warpath destroyed the offensive momentum of the rebellion. That's not to say some historians might not suggest that. Are you referring to primary sources I haven't seen?
As for the Provisions rule, I agree it is a wag at the importance of the destruction of food fields. Keep in mind Geoff that despite the Indian's initial advantage, from a historical perspective the end was never in doubt. In creating a balanced game I had to engage in a certain amount of historical licence.
