Good choice! This was Carthages last big opportunity to win the War.

You really feel how hard this one was for Hasdrubal playing the Metaurus scenario in CCA!

I set myself the task of finding games that offer a tactical-level simulation of this battle. The list can be found at:


http://www.boardgamegeek.com/geeklist/30478

It is part of Dander53's "Timeline of War" mega-list, the top level of which can be found here:

http://www.boardgamegeek.com/geeklist/25950

One has to be careful about this battle since all the 'reporting' comes from Roman sources. In other words the battle and/or even the campaign to stop him 'might' not be as close as reported. There are a number of reasons to suspect this.

Very good point, sorta like taking the chronicles of Bede with care, since every pagan king is evil and every Christian one is a saint. In the end we'll just have to take the Romans at their word, while noting that not every battle they fought was reported as close.

When I see this battle I always imagine Zapp Brannigan talking about what a "Sextiae" battle it was.

The "British" of course ("English" probably more appropriate here) incorporating lots of Vikings themselves!

English is more accurate, but I said British because I was thinking of the troubles too.

Ya know Vikings and North-western European states are a bit like dinosaurs and birds.

Yeah . But the birds usually have to kick T-Rex off of their property!

Remember that the only "King" of Ireland in the middle ages was Edward Bruce, a Scot; while Northern Ireland is essentially a Scottish colony.

Then remember that the Scots were descendants of invading Irishmen, and that the Scottish language was essentially Irish in Bruce's day.

I'll disagree on the importance - the Mongols could have swept west from Hungary and probably defeated just about any European army they'd encountered, but effective conquest would not have followed as every local princeling would still have a castle to fall back to and the Mongol army would have to fall back to the steppe were they could keep their horses fed. Effective conquest would have required prolonged campaigning, siege trains, and local allies, much as it did in southern China.

Ehm. Being in silesia they had already passed most of the woodlands. And quite successfully, dominating foresty Russia for a long time.

The Mongols would've fared better, had they been able to earn the support of Gerneral Tso and Kung Pao...

Some comments:

1. The european coalition in this battle included also probably Czech forces.

2. I like the polish name of that city (Legnica) more. First, Silesia at that period had probably stronger ties to Poland than Germany. Second, the city nowadays is in Poland and is called Legnica. Battle of Legnica - sounds nice.

Though in 1281 the city was most probably called Liegnitz in Germany, Silesia and probably Poland (though I'm not 100% sure).

I, too, am a fan of the Mongols (meaning that, although I despise them as destroyers of much that was good, I acknowledge their increadible skill at war). The question that is rarely addressed regarding the Mongol invasion of Europe is why would they want to conquer the place? It was much farther from their homeland than China and didn't have much land that a nomad would value. After (barely) defeating the Hungarians they spent a year raiding Hungary and in the course of that year didn't attack a single stone fortification. It just wasn't worth the cost.

They could have raided Europe and defeated any army they encountered (although there is always the chance of very bad luck), but to grind away, taking castle after castle and being forced to fight in the confines of Europe's forests, hills and swamps would be unappealing and not worth the effort. In fact I believe that they would ultimately have been defeated. An analogy I just thought of is that the Mongols had the capability to conquer Europe in the same sense that Germany had the ability to conquer British India in WW2.

The only British defeat ever celebrated in place names. ( Perhaps some people were too thick to notice. ) There are many Fontenoy Streets in the UK.

Why it is forgotten: we read histories in English, mostly based on English sources. Historians of all countries are more eager to write about victories than about defeats.

And sometimes defeats are portrayed as victories ...

Not sure how forgotten this is in France.

A few years ago (maybe more than a few now) a French politician complained that the Chunnel train arrived at Waterloo Station - named after a great French defeat.

He asked (rhetorically) how the English would feel if they arrived in France at "Fontenoy Station".

Here's a link to the story and yes, it's official, the BBC has classified Fontenoy as a "little-know battle":

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/208881.stm

Very funny!

I think this battle is remembered by France and Britain, but not by many others. When I first read about it I couldn't take my eyes of the page. it is worth noting the COA's Age of Reason series is only just now tackling this battle after covering many of Frederick's battles.

A few years ago, while driving in Virginia, I saw a "Yorktown Rd." That's another British defeat celebrated in a place name.

I take it then that you believe the British could not win this war?

Sometimes I read comparisons between the Revolution and Vietnam. Some make sense, but mostly theses wars were very different in terms of diplomacy, rebel commitment to victory, and the strategy of both sides. The comparisons are superficial.

I disagree that this battle had no effect on the course of the war. An American/French victory here might have ended the conflict. Instead it got prolonged, and the British victories of 1780 greatly increased the strain upon the rebels. I think if the British had made better decisions in 1781, they would have won, but that is a question of long debate.

Ultimately this battle is forgotten because we lost and gained nothing in the conflict.

I didn't say that you said the British couldn't win. That is why I put a question mark at the end.

In 1776 you are correct. The formula for victory is to destroy Washington's army and win the hearts and minds of the population. By 1781 I think the parameters have changed. For one the population no longer cares. Take Concord, Massachusetts. A hotbed of rebellion, by 1781 they were evading taxes and army recruiters. The region that would later become Vermont was toying with rejoining the British, and this plan was only scrapped after Yorktown.

The American army defeated at Savannah in 1778 was a British victory, but the big one is 1779. A coalition victory would have canceled out a British victory and bagged over 2,000 soldiers and shown that the French were very serious about aiding us. Take that with the defeat at Saratoga and the loss of Philadelphia and you have a recipe for Britain calling it quits, or at least becoming even more defensive.



The British ended up with nothing because after Camden they fumbled the ball. Cornwallis, lacking the patience to secure South Carolina, invaded North Carolina twice. Once that failed he invaded Virginia, thus exposing British gains to Greene's army. The Southern strategy was sound, but Cornwallis screwed it up.



By 1779 the armies of both sides are despised for extracting supplies. Once again I think in 1776 you are right, but as the war goes on the struggle is increasingly between the armies, with a few guerrilla bands backing each side. King's Mountain is the exception to this trend in events.

Financial and moral exhaustion almost did America in. Hell, if the active war had gone on to 1782, when the French fleet was decisively beaten, things might have really been different!

Forgotten?

I have at least three games covering this battle.

Battles of Waterloo
THE best Quad of all time - NLB
And the above pictured game.

Not the best word, that is why I use overlooked.

Part of the problem was Grant ordering attacks during the Overland Campaign on extremely strong Confederate positions against the recommendations of Meade and Warren. I think Grant had the strongest grasp of the war at a strategic level and an extremely strong sense of determination. However he lacked the tactical knowledge of Meade and Warren in terms of the Eastern Theater. Grant came east with the idea that what they were facing in Virginia was simply the same thing he faced out west combined with a notion that his commanders simply didn't want to fight when in reality they had a better understanding of the tactical considerations than Grant did. Unfortunately this resulted in attacks against strongholds at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor where Union troops had no chance of victory.

In the end Grant was fortunate that he had Meade who was such a strong battlefield tactician. I think history often overlooks how well matched these two men were in terms of their strengths and weaknesses.

Nobody.



I didn't say that the terrain in Georgia forced Sherman into his approach; I said it favored his approach. He was able, except for Kennesaw Mountain, to outmaneuver Johnston by using wide flanking movements. Johnston did not command the amount of men that Lee did and could not defend as wide a frontage. Sherman could and did launch multiple attacks, only one of which at a time was the main effort and kept Johnston guessing. The mountainous terrain allowed for this. Grant did not have that luxury because Virginia was flatter, because he was up against Lee and because Lee could defend a wider frontage than Johnston.



It was helpful that Buell's men arrived, in that they could now launch counterattacks on the 7th, but the outcome of the battle was decided before Buell got there in real strength. By the end of the day on the 6th, the Confederates were in no condition to launch more than forlorn hope attacks. They were disorganized, beaten up, and having had the onus of attack to accomplish their stated goal of capturing the landing, lost the battle with the last attack on April 6. Whether the Federals counterattacked on the 7th was a moot point, the Confederates lost by that time. The fighting on the 7th only served to enhance the Union victory.



The Confederate advantage on the left was eventually stymied and stalled by a Federal counterattack at a crossroads after Sherman solidified his second line (about the same time as the fighting at the Hornet's Nest action was occurring). Prentiss took home the concept that he had saved the army at the Hornet's Nest. The Hornet's Nest helped, but the deciding factor was the counterattack on the Federal right. This comes from the recently published book about Shiloh that Smith and Gary Joiner edited, which was originally from a doctoral thesis by a student of the battle in the 1960s. Up until the publication of the book, only the NPS guys had access to this data.

Now we'll just go in circles. I do not agree with your thoughts on Shiloh, but I must read the new book. I heard about it years ago, but I heard nothing about whether or not it added anything new.

Regardless of the book's statements without Hornet's nest, I see the Union losing or the victory being much less. Grant's low opinion of the action by Prentiss was more personal, the same sort of stuff that made him critical of Rosecrans and diminish his accomplishments.



Johnston had over 60,000 men and often did hold a wider front than Lee. Sherman's movements were made easier by the terrain, but I don't see how the terrain forced Grant to attack Lee when he ended up turning the flank to advance anyway. If Sherman wasn't forced into his, then nether was Grant. He had options.

Hmm? I answered this post yesterday, but I don't see my response here.




The Hornet's Nest helped, but there is evidence in the book that it was not the turning point of the battle. the aforementioned midafternoon counterattack on the Federal right by elements of Sherman's division is what really took steam out of the Confederate attack. As for Prentiss, it was he and not Grant, who heavily influenced the press after Shiloh. The aftermath of the battle was probably the low point of Grant's ACW career (politically, at least).

As for Grant's being unfair to Rosecrans, I concur completely. I'll go one further - I also think he was unfair to Thomas.



Because of the mountainous terrain it was easier for Sherman to mask his moves and fool Johnston as to his intentions. Lee had the benefit of getting to the chosen ground before Grant could get there. And, of course, since Lee and the ANV were the real targets. Lee also had better cavalry than Johnston and could shadow Grant better than Johnston could shadow Sherman.

Let's face it, the one thing that Lee was truly afraid of was exactly what Grant did - targeting him, not Richmond.

Prentiss made a good bid with the pres to be the hero (stubborn defenses always read well), but for years after Grant downplayed his role because he didn't like him. Beyond Grant's tactical limitations, what I think his other weakness was an annoying cliquishness that determined a lot of his personnel decisions. Rosecrans, Thomas, Gordon Granger, Lew Wallace, Hooker, and Prentiss all found themselves marginalized for personal more than professional reasons. The main reason Thomas and Granger stayed in high command was because their raw talent out-weighted Grant's distaste while the others found themselves shelved as soon as they made a mistake. I understand the preference for those you work well with, but Grant told Lincoln Stones River was not a great victory when Lincoln was recalling all the big moments of the war!



I still don't see how Grant's attacks make sense. It is worth noting that Sherman was helped by the terrain but often times he found Johnston waiting for him too. My basic argument is that making an army the target in the Civil War is a mistake due to the nature of defense and the ability of armies to take heavy losses and still fight. Cities are the proper targets of an army fighting a conventional war. This doesn't mean you don't fight the enemy, but one should fight him when you have him at a disadvantage and not on ground well prepared for defense. Once Napoleon simply sought battle for the sake of fighting his enemy he began to lose his grip. Grant's Vicksburg campaign is a superb example of what I'm getting at.

Until 1865 I think the only time Lee's army was close to being destroyed was at Antietam. Otherwise I don't see many times a Union army could have reasonably destroyed Lee. I also would have liked to see the reaction of Lincoln and politicians to any general before Grant waging an Overland Campaign with those high losses.



Where is the evidence that this scared Lee? If anything it was that Grant kept moving on after tactical defeat that scared Lee, if one could scare Marse Robert.

Also forgotten in part because despite this undoubted victory, soon after Russia fell apart and eventually surrendered to Germany and Austria-Hungary. And it overlapped in part with the British/French offensive at the Somme, which we hear more about.

In any great victory there is a hopelessly incompetent loser. Austria-Hungary dragged the Central Powers into this disastrous war after neglecting their military for years.

It reminds me of the War of 1812, stupid politicians demanding a war they refused to fund.

But your main point is really hammered home: winning a great battle in a lost war gets you nothing.

Part of the problem was the Russians not realizing what they had accomplished. After their success, they returned to human wave attacks with the associated costs.

Real important battle tho, I've seen it descibed as the battle that led to the downfall of the Russian and Austrian Empires.

Some of the generals didn't learn (hell most didn't learn during this war). I think Brusilov returned to human waves because he was trying (or forced) to fit too many men into a narrow front as the offensive continued. Am I right or wrong about this?

Fascinating!

The battle is not that overlooked. While probably not very known among "western" people, I saw it often mentioned in the top50 or top 100 most important battles ever. In Poland it's celebrated every year in Warsaw and small towns around it (Radzymin, Ossów).

Now Grunwald is massive - that's the one battle and date that every polish kid knows. The book about the battle (and the whole war with teutonic knights) has been described nicely in the great "Krzyżacy" novel by Sienkiewicz (nobel prize winner). The movie from 1960 based on the novel is also worth watching, though probably hard to find outside of Poland.

The battle is staged every year in summer, see: http://www.grunwald1410.pl/

i noted that for some people, whether they be from a certain country or an expert, but these battles are not that well known to the general populace of historians and buffs. I read about World War II for years and it wasn't until I was 24 that I learned of the Polish contribution to mobile warfare.

Fairly easy to find in the US actually, and it is on Netflix.

Fun if only for the terrible acting

This should have been a message to the Japanese that their superior training was not sufficient to win the war. Fortunately, they didn't get it.

Joe citizen knows only two things about the Pacific War, and they might even not know about that.

Pearl Harbor attack.
Hiroshima. Nagasaki is even unknown.

I can say Pearl Harbor or Hiroshima to just about anyone, and they know it. Coral See, Midway, or Guadalcanal is blank stare material.

Nah, people are vaguely familiar with Iwo Jima and Okinawa too.

And I don't know anyone over 25 who doesn't know Wake Island!

"Your superior intellect is no match for our primitive weaponry!"
--Alien Invaders from a 'The Simpson's' episode

I believe training should be considered similar to aircraft in military style parlance..they are a force multiplier, but not a force unto themselves. However, Leadership is an even more intangible attribute with potentially greater tangible results.

As for the Japanese not realizing superior training wouldn't win the war, guess they believed their own propaganda.

Interesting observation. My knowledge of the Algerian conflict is limited - I should correct this.

The idea that the United States lost the Vietnam War because they failed to heed the lessons of this battle are slightly exaggerated (though I do admit you do not explicitly say this, it is implied).

When one looks at the historical record of the 20th century there are very few 'low intensity' conflicts (guerrilla warfare) that have been victorious by a foreign occupying power against an indigenous people.

It can be argued that the so-called 'Malayan Emergency' from 1948 to 1960 is the only example of such a victory. But it can also be argued that this was not an exception because it was fought largely against a Chinese minority rather than against Malaysians.

Actually, you can go back to the American Revolution without finding any examples of defeating a modern insurgent movement by a foreign power (two types of cases are purposely excluded, primitive insurgencies such as the resistance by the American Indians and anti-guerrilla warfare by indigenous powers such as the Russian Civil War and the Vendée). From this point of view the problem isn't merely "not heeding the lessons" of this or that forgotten battle but the general mind set of the modernist. They could win or lose a million battles and they will never heed the lessons.

I think in a lot of ways that is the unheeded message of this battle: tactical ability cannot overcome a revolt and should be generally avoided. Victory can be achieved, but it will take a lot of time and patience.



That appears to be the main reason for the victory there, although I think the British offered the people real political benefits (I might be mistaken). In Vietnam we supported a series of openly incompetent and corrupt dictators.



Possibly. I don't see the American Revolution as an insurgency per se, more like secession with Enlightenment and proto-Capatlist rhetoric supported by a list of grievances that with hindsight look flimsy, but were in actually a defense of English rights. I say this in part because the battles were European style, many easily could have been fought the same way by the British and French in Flanders. Also the enthusiasm of the people for the revolution was weak. Indeed your average colonist saw no reason to sacrifice anything for George III or George Washington.

Bigeard plays a big role in "Hell in a Very Small Place" about another overlooked battle, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Another example would be the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902. Although U.S. tactics were at times ruthless and brutal the end result was the Philippine resistance, both conventional and unconventional, was crushed and beaten into submission.

If the examples, of the Russian Civil War, the American Indian and the Vendee are thrown in with the Philippine Revolution, a war that could rightfully be argued to have lasted until 1913, it would seem that the only lesson that counter-insurgency has to teach is - victory through unrelenting and prolonged genocide. That's a price for victory that should be too high to pay.

Sounds like guerrilla warfare to me.

You write "Victory can be achieved, but it will take a lot of time and patience."

What is your proof? What exactly do you mean by "time and patience". Getting a colic baby to sleep takes time and patience. I know. What do you mean in terms of counter-insurgency? Time, many years? Patience, ignore mounting casualties with no apparent progress on the ground?

I would agree that a prolonged and ruthless genocide can suppress an indigenous irregular warfare. But, personally, I am against genocide and therefor against counter-insurgency warfare. But obviously you have a different conception of successful counter-insurgency strategy. Could you describe it in terms a little more specific than, "time & patience"? Sorry, for asking so directly, but I was interested by your statement, "Victory can be achieved" without any historical examples or elaboration.

Of course there were guerrillas who fought the British, but ultimately the war is won at Yorktown, which is a classic European siege.



My proof: have you ever heard of a guerrilla war that ended quickly? Meanwhile many of the wars fought end in a only 1-3 years. Just look at the contests between Turkey and Russia.



So far you only have two routes: genocide or offering some real reforms. More commonly some form of genocide works, as it did in German East Africa and aganist the Boers. This isn't a problem before the age of mass media, but now it is difficult to hide such activities. I think this makes reform and benefits to the people the only viable option.

I am aganist genocide, but in the past it was often used and was often successful, which is partially why conquering powers from Rome until today used it. Difference is with mass media and advanced ideas of human rights these strategies are less viable. I cannot condemn the ancients or Medieval people for genocide; they had very different thoughts on human life, but I can say in the Post-Enlightenment world that these strategies are vile.

The same could be said for the Vietnam War. After the United States pulled out in 1973 the Vietnam War radically changed. Guerrilla warfare was replaced by standard warfare. North Vietnam launched offensives in 1974 and 1975 that were regular warfare in every sense of the word. Two wargames cover the 1975 Battle of Xuan Loc where the 18th ARVIN Division held out for two weeks, Defiance: The Battle of Xuan Loc and Meatgrinder Battle of Xuan Loc April 1975. Actually, the same could be said for any guerrilla war. After a successful guerrilla war, it inevitably changes to normal warfare to eject the resistant power from it's last strong holds.



Actually, I was asking, what is your proof that these methods can defeat irregular warfare? Not if guerrilla war lasts a long time.



Yes, this is what I was driving at. But you still didn't answer the question so I'll rephrase it. You give two perfect examples of genocide defeating insurgent movements, German East Africa and the British war against the Boers, but can you give me an example of "reform and benefits to the people" defeating any guerrilla war? You can't because there is no example. It is really just a modernist myth or misconception. I say this from a post-modernist point of view. Even the Boston Tea Party was caused by a British attempt to lower the price of tea. We didn't care because we wanted independence. There is no example of political reform winning a counter-insurgency war in modern history. The concept that reforms and benefits for the people will win a guerrilla war is a common sense assumption on the order of the previous common sense assumption that the world is flat. It is easy to see how the modernist conception of the world is more rational than the medieval conception. Modernists have been able to disbelieve superstition, for example. But the modernist mind has it's own irrationalities that it clings too.

You are right about Vietnam, but not the Revolution. The American revolt was a conventional war with some guerrilla activities on the periphery. At no point was it ever a guerrilla war and it could have been won without using counter-insurgency tactics.



Interesting, I didn't see a question about when reform worked to end a revolt, but I guess you meant that I didn't explain what I meant by "with time and patience."

You are wrong. Reform has worked before, but it is best as a preemptive measure, as it was used in Canada in the 1800s. By the same token the failure to reform caused a guerrilla war in Ireland and made the situation in Indian volatile. Once the war has started reform can work. It worked in ending the revolts in Malaya, Thailand, and El Salvador. The regions of Spain where the French acted in more helpful ways were the quiet sectors. Problem is to make someone revolt you usually need rulers who are corrupt and incompetent, a combination that does not lend itself to reform. Also winning through reform is not glamorous, and often the military aspect of such victories is played up.

The third way is to stick around and fight it out for many years, possibly decades and hope the guerrillas never build the capacity to win on a conventional level. This is how Rome conquered Spain.

Modernist? Post-Modernists? Explain what you mean when you use these words. Also if you are a "Post-Modernists" then what are your superstitions?

I beg to differ. Though the Battle of Concord began as a set piece battle between to opposing lines of men it became something entirely different as the day progressed. By noon the British forces in Concord were clearly out numbered and began an ordered retreat. Along the way American irregulars fighting from behind trees and walls in a very un-European way ambushed the British numerous times turning the retreat into a trotting run at first and then a full rout in the afternoon.

Yes, the British were defeated at Yorktown but what happened to all the territory they had supposedly just conquered, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia? As the British Army passed through these states Loyalists were installed into leadership positions. But as soon as the British Army advanced these areas were quickly returned to rebel control through an irregular warfare that immediate flared up.

The American Revolution is known for a handful of battles of which the Americans lost most of, much like the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. Guerrilla warfare was a constant during the revolution and prevented the British from operating outside of their strong holds in less than company size formations. Irregular warfare during the American Revolution does not get much attention from historians because there are very few records of these small but collectively crucial fights.

It is often true that our high school educations are woefully inaccurate but what do you think they are talking about when they say that Americans organized themselves into "minute men" who were ready to fight from their fields and homes in a minute and who fought from behind trees and farm walls? That's guerrilla warfare. I guess when Americans do it we just can't see the obvious.

If Czechoslovakia preemptively surrenders to Nazi Germany it will prevent a war. If a government preemptively reforms itself (abolishes it's monarchy and becomes a republic, grants self-government or independence to a colony, allows free and fair elections) it can and will prevent a revolution. Why? Because there is no longer a reason for revolution. So your assertion that governments can preemptively prevent revolution through reforms is of course true. But this is really besides the point, for example, the United States never allowed free elections in Vietnam. As far as Malaysia, the revolution lasted from 1948 to 1960. In 1957 the British granted independence to Malaysia. Was the revolution defeated or did it win?
As far as Thailand, what war are you talking about? In El Salvador, amnesty for the rebel groups was granted and free elections were held. This is what the revolutionaries had been fighting for. Again was the revolution defeated or did it win? Your assertion that regions of Spain were quiet during the French occupation where they were "more helpful" is a travesty to history and the inhumanity of the French occupation of Spain.

"In a few cases, the tactics showed signs of succeeding. The tough and talented Marshal Louis Suchet, for instance, managed for a time to impose something close to peace and order in areas of the north. He did so in part through co-opting nobles and other large landowners and in part through terror. His mobile columns shot captured guerillas and priests found with weapons out of hand. They virtually wiped the town of Saliente off the map, much as Marshal Massena had destroyed Lauria in Calabria. Suchet took hostages and tried to recruit local auxiliaries. But as the historian of this campaign in Aragon concludes: "Suchet's success was deceptive and fleeting. He had not eliminated resistance, only stunned it." - The First Total War by David A. Bell


The medieval mind cannot recognize it's own superstitions as "superstitions". What makes it "medieval" is it's inability to see it's own irrationalities. But while the medieval mind set is blind to it's own irrationalities, the modern view of the world and reality can easily perceive medieval limitations. The same goes for modernist and post-modern views of the world. The post-modernist can see the irrational myths of the medieval and the modernist world views but is ultimately blind to it's own presumptions. At any rate, post-modern superstitions are irrelevant today. Imagine, if the King of France were to condemn modernist irrationalities and the concept of the republic, for example, because he said that republics will not create a utopia. The argument would be spurious because the advancements of the republic and capitalism over absolute monarchy and monopoly mercantilism are so great and obvious that a republic's inability to result in a utopia would be irrelevant. The leap in thinking that post-modernism represents over modernism is such an advance.

After that battle the rebels formed up and then fought a European style battle at Bunker Hill. The guerrilla nature of the fighting after Concord has more to do with circumstance and the units involved than with design.



The areas you speak of were reconquered by Greene's army because Cornwallis was in Virginia wasting his time. Irregulars were successful, but they could not win back the interior unaided.



We lost more battles, but our record was better than the Vietnamese record because by 1778 we could go toe to toe with the British regular and not be humiliated (NVA never quite managed this but that has to do with technology). The British could and did act out of their strongholds as evidence in Georgia and South Carolina from 1778-1780; what usually prevented them was a field army, like Washington at New York. Guerrillas could cause problems in supply and control, but their victories are patchy, and often times they botched the defense (Virginia, New Haven) although granted the odds were long. In the early going I think you have a point, but as the war drags on the people don't care who wins, just so long as neither army asks too much of them.



What is obvious to me is that the Revolution was mostly a conventional Age of Reason war. The minute man thing is a myth perpetuated by Jefferson's Republicans and historians who did not what to admit that the British were beaten by a European style army. This common man defense stuff sat well with the intellectuals and the populace, both eager to pat themselves on the back after they did little to secure victory. This militia myth was carried to the War of 1812, where it failed in the face of British regulars. Check out A Respectable Army and A Revolutionary People at War for further evidence.

Then where do you see modernism in my thoughts and post-modernism in your thoughts? Furthermore, what is modernism and post-modernism? I know it is a million dollar question, but try. Also how does this equate with historical interpretation? And are you sure post-modernism is above modernism? Maybe it is a step backwards?



Why?



This is a leap? Sounds more like esoteric word games. I get the humor of the situation, but I don't see much of a leap. Enlighten me if you will?

We may not agree on many points, but this has been one hell of a mental chess game. Thank you kind sir.

We may agree on more points than you, I or we realize. Though I may disagree with your assessment of irregular warfare I would suspect I agree, in the main, with your assessment of the other battles listed here. And I also agree with your methodology. Rather than resort to name calling or personal attack you've stuck to the points and presented your own counter evidence to my assertions. And I wholeheartedly agree with this. I would guess that when this debate is concluded your assessment of the peripheral nature of irregular warfare during the American Revolution may be amended a bit and my view of it's prominence my also be downgraded a notch. For example, your description of the American Revolution as a secessionist movement is on the money in New England (and quite clever), which I hadn't considered before.

As far as post-modernism I have my own take on it that I find extremely enlightening for myself, no mean goal. To begin with I would like to make an observation: no one or very few, judge an artist by his writings about art and no one judges a general by his writings on war (BTW the Rommel Papers are amazing but obviously Rommel's main historic achievements were done on the battlefield). I would make the same assertion for philosophy, don't confuse the poor writing done by most philosophers for their ideas. In that vein I find the reams of post-modernist writings today to be extremely poor, done in an unimaginative attempt to emulate their heros, such as, Michel Foucault, who coin the term "post-modernism" and Francois Derrida, who coined the term "deconstruction".

For me wargames are a perfect example of the term "deconstruction". A wargame attempts to sweep away all of the superfluous rhetoric that envelopes war and distill it down to a few generalizations or it's skeletal structure. In this way a wargame is a deconstruction of war. Not the only possible deconstruction but a valuable deconstruction never-the-less. Now that can make perfect sense to a wargamer but try to explain that to a non-wargamer. Post-modernism is the result of a similar deconstruction, but a deconstruction of philosophy itself. So the problem of answering the question, "what is post-modernism?" becomes two fold:
1) To simply spew out a quick and dirty sound bite of an answer cheats the listener of the essence of the idea because -
2) Post-modernism is a evolutionary concept that implies an understanding of the history of philosophy in at least outline form. For example, imagine someone attempting to explain the concept of biological evolution if the listener had only a knowledge of present day fauna and no knowledge of prehistoric mammals, dinosaurs or even fossils. Frankly, it would be impossible.

Thank you. Debate must never turn into personally negative statements; it detracts from the true objective of discussion and gets nowhere. I despise William F. Buckley, but I respect that he rarely resorted to anything like personal attacks. Yes, I have reconsidered guerrilla warfare in terms of its impact. Clearly their were guerrilla and localized actions that succeeded, such as Bennington and King's Mountain. I just think that ultimately the war is decided in a European fashion and the guerrilla aspect is played up to make us look good and different from our British brothers, when we were transplanted Englishmen more hungry for inclusion in the empire than in liberty.



It sounds like post-modernism has reached the end of it tether then, as replication and stagnant ideas become prevalent.



I understand modernism but post-modernism remains a mystery despite some intense reading on the subject. Post-modernism feels like a grand in-joke of intellectuals laughing at human existence. It seems to be about the malleability of media and art, and gets caught up in self-reflective ideas because it has a long past to look back at. It also seems born of the media jumble, in which we have so many art forms that we thus have numerous movements within an age of replication and consumerism. Post-modernism's opaque status mirrors this reality. Worst of all it seems to offer only criticism; solutions do not seem to be part of the Post-modernist cosmos.

Deconstructionism is something I dread. I believe that it has killed painting and poetry, and made philosophy irrelevant. I have no evidence, only my gut feeling because each time a genre is deconstructed and starts to become a serious parody of itself or ignore the importance of forms, it then enters the realm of irrelevance. Deconstruction is artistic and philosophical societal collapse as far as I can see.

All of this is contrasts to the Enlightenment and Romanticism. I understand them and occasionally envy that I do not live at that time for this reason. My understanding doesn't make it superior (that is silly) but they do not frustrate me in the same way.

I still most return to how you see modernism and post-modernism in our respective points and how is post-modernism is a leap? You can answer because your criteria involves a knowledge of the history of philosophy and I am well versed in that.